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Isolation as Disability and Resource:
Considering Sub-national Island Status in
the Constitution of the ‘New Tasmania’
ELAINE STRATFORD
Sustainable Communities Research Group, University of Tasmania, Australia
ABSTRACT The peoples and governments of island nation-states appear to use isolation as a
jurisdictional resource to address the challenges of economic globalization. This tactic is pro-
nounced in relation to tourism and property developments, which have the potential to be
especially internally divisive. But what of sub-national island jurisdictions? Australia’s foundation
is, in part, indebted to British colonial ideas about a commonwealth of increase: its creation as a
symmetrical federation (albeit with pronounced asymmetries) reflecting a desire to modulate the
effects of central and peripheral economic activity. In this federation isolation is used in particular
in the distribution of national funds to six states and two territories—referred to here as sub-
national jurisdictions. For example, the island state of Tasmania is perhaps the most marginal of
all such sub-national jurisdictions; insular in many ways, remote, detached. Evidence suggests
that Tasmanians use isolation in different ways to both stabilize and unsettle the direction of
development there. With reference to official attempts to create a ‘New Tasmania’, typified by an
ability to attract substantial investment dollars in tourism and coastal subdivisions, I highlight the
effects of conflicts that may arise when isolation and ‘islandness’ are deployed as tools for
economic ‘progress’ and as characteristics to aid resistance against globalization’s homogenizing
tendencies to render ‘everywhere the same’.
KEY WORDS: ‘Islandness’, isolation, federalism, development, isomorphism, Tasmania
Introduction
In an era where size becomes synonymous with might, the cultural, historical,
and material importance of islands to world history has been generally
ignored . . . British colonial activity in island spaces became mystified through
the literary construction of isolated islands . . . awaiting . . . ‘development’ . . . [and
it inscribed] an insoluble contradiction . . . that islands are simultaneously
isolated yet deeply susceptible to migration and settlement . . .We have to
question who benefits from the persistent myth of island isolation. (Deloughrey,
2004, p. 300)
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Nikolas Rose suggests that government has been made possible only by ‘‘defining
boundaries, rendering them visible, assembling information about that which is
included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces [such as identities] and
entities [such as nations] thus revealed’’ (Rose, 2003, p. 33). But these visible
boundaries, assemblages and techniques are unstable, and this instability gives rise to
new forms of economic space and spatializations of governmental thought. Three
lines of inquiry are suggested. The first requires understanding the territorialization
of governmental thought, the act of ‘‘marking out a territory in thought and
inscribing it in the real’’ (Rose, 2003, p. 34). The second warrants an appreciation of
the spatializing of the gaze of those who govern, using inscription devices such as
maps, charts and diagrams (Richardson, 2005). These devices serve to produce
conviction in others in order to stabilize the space to be governed as ‘the real’. The
third suggests the need to understand the impetus to model the space of government
as isotropic—to render everywhere the same. These ‘‘concrete realizations of
imaginary space stand in, in thought, for that which they realize . . . take on a life of
their own, and are invested with powers which appear to allow the mastery of the
phenomena they imagine or model’’ (Rose, 2003, p. 38). Among other things, what
emerge are colonies, federations, states and their sub-national jurisdictions, citizens
identifiable by their attachment to place, and the intergovernmental relations
through which they negotiate their relative positions.
Intergovernmental relations in federal states may be typified by cooperative
contest between those who govern the states nationally and those who govern their
constituent sub-national jurisdictions. Equally, internal relations between sub-
national governments and their citizens can be testing, especially where shifts in the
global marketplace affect local attachment to place. Understanding how such
relations influence our being in place means comprehending the consequence of
various strategies and tactics of government that shape conduct and constitute
regimes of truth (Dean, 1999).
Among other things, an island is a ‘‘sharply precise physical entity which
accentuates clear and holistic notions of location and identity’’ (Baldacchino, 2004a,
p. 272). Islands are also profoundly spatialized in governmental thought, and it is a
distinct challenge to protect them from globalizing tendencies to render everywhere
the same (Pe´ron, 2004). Addressing such challenges has characterized much island
scholarship. In the process, studies of the nation-state are favoured over those of
sub-national jurisdictions (Anckar, 2002; Armstrong and Read, 2003; Baldacchino,
2004a; 2004b; Bertram and Watters, 1985; Cau, 1999; Hache, 1998). Yet, just as
governments of island states may leverage insularity as a jurisdictional resource in
international negotiations about development, so the sub-national island jurisdiction
whose ‘parent’ is a mainland or continental territory may deploy its status as a key
mechanism of distinction from mainland ‘siblings’, and strive to minimize certain
asymmetries of federalism.
From the 1820s to the 1890s the idea of the federation of Australia was forged by
colonial leaders seeking a ‘common wealth of increase’ within the constraint of
British foreign policy and the imperial government’s cautious position on the
dominion following its North American losses (Brown, 2004). The jurisdiction was
created by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901, and now
comprises six provinces called ‘states’—New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia,
576 E. Stratford
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Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania—and two territories—the Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory. All but the last two have full
statehood, the Northern Territory’s more limited status being largely determined on
the basis of population size and the ACT’s because of its ‘capital’ function (just like
the District of Columbia in the USA). In such an arrangement sub-national
distinctiveness—expressed through the performance of place and identity—becomes
imperative. The reasons for this need may be explained as follows. Federations such
as Australia are constituted for diverse reasons, not least among them the ability to
account for the presence of core and peripheral economic zones. In certain
jurisdictions these zones have prompted the formation of ‘‘asymmetrical federal
designs: certain regions receive more autonomy than others; or the autonomy that is
granted to one type of region may be different from the autonomy that is granted
to another type’’ (Swenden and Beaufays, 2005, no page number). In the case of
Australia, however, zones of central and peripheral influence fostered the con-
stitution of a symmetrical federation, in which enshrined uniformities are resisted
and practices of distinction are cultivated among the sub-national jurisdictions that
comprise the whole.
Such practices of distinction become apparent in various ways. Two such practices
are intergovernmental fiscal negotiations to secure preferential treatment because of
idiosyncratic circumstances, such as Tasmanians being able to claim remote island
status and use isolation as a ‘disability’; and efforts to attract offshore investment,
such as when Tasmanians capitalize on the development appeal that adheres to
island status as a ‘resource’—isolation included (Baldacchino, 2004b).
In light of the foregoing I intend to examine the emergence of the ‘New Tasmania’
as an open and accessible island imaginary of global international desire, which some
suggest is at risk of reduction to an ‘everywhere’. The term ‘New Tasmania’
encapsulates a thrust by State Government to ensure that Tasmania benefits from
economic globalization by marketing its natural advantages (as an island) without
degrading those same advantages. The New Tasmania is meant to attract ‘the big
end of town’ in ecotourist and sustainable tourism resorts, and in new coastal
residential subdivisions, but this is the subject of considerable dissent. In view of this
opposition, and given what is at stake for sub-national island peoples struggling to
come to terms with the demands of modernity, it is instructive to ask how
Tasmanians are using isolated and island status as resources to negotiate the
direction of development—especially tourism and property development. What does
the creation of the New Tasmania mean in the context of globalization’s
simultaneously homogenizing and destabilizing embrace? In addressing these
questions, I first examine how isolation has been constituted as a disability in
intergovernmental relations. I then explore how isolation is (re)deployed to
Tasmania’s apparent advantage in Australian federal fiscal equalization strategies
featuring the Bass Strait as the maritime extension of the national highway that
carries to the island’s shore tourists and those seeking a more permanent sea change.
I therefore elaborate on certain debates that characterize the controversial emergence
of the New Tasmania to emphasize the use of isolation as a special resource among
those who question the shape, directions and values of this newly spatialized place as
a locus of globalized tourism and property development. Through these efforts the
larger task at hand is to contribute to the growing literature on sub-national island
Considering Sub-national Island Status in the Constitution of the ‘New Tasmania’ 577
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jurisdictions as particular categories of place in which questions of governance play
out, and to further pursue research on islands, sustainable development and
globalization (Armstrong and Stratford, 2004; Stratford, 2003; 2006; Stratford,
et al., 2003).
Observations on Australian Federal Fiscal Equalization
Each sub-national jurisdiction in Australia has its own constitution, laws and
economic activities. Each is also highly dependent on the Australian Government
(Chapman, 1982; Kline, 2002; Walker, 1999). In a sense this is dependency by
agreement, whereby central funds are distributed to the states using the principles of
fiscal equalization (Australian Government, Commonwealth Grants Commission,
2005). It is based on the foundational assumption that ‘‘each State should be able to
provide the same standard of services to its population, if it operates at the same
level of efficiency and makes the same effort to raise revenues from its own sources’’
(Searle, 2002, p. 1).
There are various problems with ensuring horizontal political and economic
balance among strong and weak states; and challenges exist in securing vertical fiscal
balance between the Commonwealth and the states. Mathews (no date) notes that
most of the costly expenditure functions have been retained by the states, with
taxation being the privilege of the Commonwealth alongside the distribution of
general revenue grants (GRGs) and special purpose payments (SPPs).1 He also
maintains that ‘‘imbalance has always been less marked in Australia . . . personal
incomes per head in the smallest and poorest State, Tasmania, have never been more
than about 20 per cent below those of the most populous and richest States of New
South Wales and Victoria’’ (Mathews, 1977, p. 4).
A relatively early response to intergovernmental fiscal imbalance2 was the esta-
blishment in 1933 of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC).3 Its decisions
about financial matters are based on need, and its operation has been remarkably
effective, given what is at stake in terms of competition among territories and
populations. However, discontent about apparent inequities in the system
ran especially high in the 1980s and 1990s, and in June 1999 the parties
signed an Intergovernmental Agreement on Principles for the Reform of Common-
wealth – State Financial Relations (IGA) during the introduction of the Goods and
Services Tax (GST) and abolition of various Commonwealth and state taxes. Under
the IGA, ‘‘the Commonwealth returns . . . revenue collected from the GST . . . to the
States, but no longer pays them revenue replacement payments or gives them untied
financial assistance grants . . . [with the guarantee that they] . . . will be no worse off
than under . . . former . . . arrangements’’ (Searle, 2002, p. 9). Nevertheless, Eslake’s
(2004) analysis of the state’s economic outlook suggests that Tasmania has been
receiving diminishing levels of commonwealth funds over a number of years.
So-called ‘disabilities’ are an important consideration for the CGC in its deli-
berations on fiscal equalization. These are ‘‘influences beyond a State’s control that
require it to spend more (or less) to provide the same service as other States, or mean
that it cannot raise as much revenue as (or can raise more than) other States from the
same tax rates’’ (Searle, 2002, p. 21). Isolation is one such disability for which states
gain special consideration in negotiations over fiscal equalization because, in general
578 E. Stratford
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terms, it is thought to impede development. ‘‘Isolation disabilities relate to
unavoidable costs incurred by some States because of the distances of those States
from other State capitals and sources of supply. Isolation-related costs are con-
sidered to affect most State functions’’ (Australian Government, Commonwealth
Grants Commission, 2002, p. 1). They include labour and freight costs; airfares and
travel allowances; travel-related subsidies; professional infrastructure; and commer-
cial isolation.
The CGC assesses isolation-related expenditure for each state and compares that
expenditure with the Australian average to derive an ‘isolation factor’. The most
remote and least developed, the Northern Territory, completely dominates the
national scene, taking up just under 88% of the isolation factor by itself. However,
when the latter is removed from the picture as ‘anomalous’ (justified because it is the
least developed jurisdiction, has a low population threshold, and underdeveloped
social and economic infrastructure), Tasmania accounts for just under 48%
(Australian Government, Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2002; 2003).
Playing the Isolation Card
Baldacchino’s (2006) observation that sub-national jurisdictions possess the capacity
for both shared and self-rule; have autonomy and strong identity; and exhibit high
levels of administrative, political, bureaucratic and cultural powers appears generally
supported in the Australian federation. Separated from mainland Australia by
the 250 km stretch of Bass Strait, Tasmania is the smallest and most peripheral state
in the federation, and is its only island member at that jurisdictional level. According
to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005), the total area of the state—including
its 334-plus offshore islands—is 68 102 km2 or 0.9% of the total area of Australia.
Total imports were valued at AU$669 million, while exports were valued at $2317
million in 2003 – 04 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Crucial to that outcome
were agriculture and horticulture, mining, aquaculture and fisheries, and forestry, as
well as the manufacturing that derives from those primary industries. For the same
period expenditure by some 739 800 adult visitors to Tasmania was $1073.5 million.
It is useful to note at this point—in order to revisit below—that highly volatile
debates often erupt around the direction of development in Tasmania. Tourism and
property developments in particular are debated among the populace and raise
questions about what it means to be Tasmanian and live on the island.
Isolation provides significant dividends to Tasmania via Commonwealth funding
calculated to offset the disadvantages of peripherality more generally. Nevertheless,
successive Tasmanian governments have avoided the term in marketing the state to
national and international investors in tourism and property development, except
where it is evocative of the ‘island paradise’. To do so might be to emphasize the
term’s apparent disadvantages. Indeed, in Tourism Tasmania’s (2004) Tourism
Development Kit for prospective developers, the term does not appear, except
implicitly as a burden to investment overcome:
For most of its history, Australia’s smallest and most distinctive State was a
secret shared by a select group of holidaymakers captivated by its unspoilt
nature, charming heritage and island lifestyle. But Tasmania is a secret no
Considering Sub-national Island Status in the Constitution of the ‘New Tasmania’ 579
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longer [and now its] island appeal is complemented by excellent sea and air
access . . .With $400 million worth of tourism development already underway or
planned . . . Tasmania [is] one of the world’s hottest holiday destinations.
(Tasmanian Government, Tourism Tasmania, 2004)
In short, the use of isolation in federal fiscal negotiations and marketing for tourism
and property development suggests a clear understanding by government of term’s
utility in the changing and competitive conditions of the market, and of the need to
punctuate the island state’s sameness and difference, its proximity and distance,
within the Australian federation. This insight is worth exploring further, first by
reference to the Bass Strait and then by considering recent conflicts over property
development.
The Bass Strait Factor
In Australia the condition of each sub-national jurisdiction is regularly standardized,
such that federation is constantly stabilized and the principles of fiscal equalization
are upheld. This observation extends to a most distinguishing feature of Tasmania—
the Bass Strait, which separates it from the mainland and marks it both as island and
as isolated.4 Hence the State Government’s introduction of the Tasmanian Freight
Equalisation Scheme5 and the Bass Strait Passenger Vehicle Equalisation Scheme.
Implemented in September 1996, the Bass Strait Passenger Vehicle Equalisation
Scheme is a rebate system to ‘‘reduce the cost disadvantage associated with trans-
porting passenger vehicles across Bass Strait, thereby increasing passenger travel
between Tasmania and the mainland, on what is essentially Tasmania’s sea
highway’’ (Addison, 2005, no page number). It is:
calculated on the basis of charging a net fare for an eligible passenger vehicle
plus driver travelling in standard share accommodation, that is comparable to
the notional cost of driving an equivalent distance on a highway . . . based upon
the sea distance of 427 kilometres between the ports of Devonport [in Tasmania]
and Melbourne [in Victoria] multiplied by an estimated running cost for an
average family saloon . . . The rebate is an ‘up front’ subsidy . . . provided to the
driver [as a subsidy to the payable fare] . . . [and funding] for the scheme is
demand-driven. (Carlson, 1998, no page)
During the period between 1996 and 2002 the TT Line, a Tasmanian government
business enterprise, received nearly 100% of Commonwealth Government subsidies
to payable fares. It also commissioned a second ferry to be built, the Spirit of
Tasmania II, implying that it owned and benefited from previous payments to Spirit
I (Australian Government, Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 2004). Of
the 1 070 334 adult passengers enumerated over the period, 652 234 (60%) were
visitors and, of those, 52% were in Tasmania for holidays—thought to be a positive
sign for tourism and the state’s economy. Buoyed by these developments,
the Tasmanian Government determined in 2004 to purchase a Spirit of Tasmania
III to work between the island and Australia’s largest and most popular tourist
destination, the city of Sydney.
580 E. Stratford
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However, in March 2005 it was revealed that passenger and freight movements on
the Spirit III had been grossly overestimated. The Tasmanian Department of
Treasury and Finance has since calculated that accumulated losses on the Sydney
service may amount to $90 million in the period to 2011 – 12 (Tasmania
Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, 2005). Were the service to
cease, somewhere between 5000 and 10 000 visitors (representing $10 – $20 million
per annum) could be lost to the island. Yet its retention requires the Tasmanian
government to provide a subsidy of $145 million to its TT Line over the period to
2012, a figure of $2500 per visitor, ‘‘far in excess of the average benefit tourists bring
through their spending in Tasmania’’ (Tasmania Government, Department of
Treasury and Finance, 2005, no page number).
It is noteworthy that the preferred advice of the Tasmanian Department of
Treasury and Finance to sell Spirit III was rejected in favour of a subsidy pro-
gramme. In defending the decision to keep the service in the Tasmanian House of
Assembly on 15 March 2005, Premier Paul Lennon stated:
If we don’t take on challenges, we’ll stand still . . .We have something special
here in Tasmania . . .We have a quality lifestyle and quality environment and we
can share that with other Australians. Spirit III is a key part of that
strategy . . . [and the] vision and determination to break into a new tourism
market that led to [its purchase] remains valid . . . to retain Spirit III is an
investment in our future—and in the future of generations to come. (Lennon,
2005, no page)6
This statement is a clear articulation of the New Tasmania, and it appears to
invoke the conquest of isolation, summon up an image of Tasmania as a haven from
the madness of places ‘off-island’, and pay tribute to the intergenerational benefits of
engaging in the global market.
Yet for others in Tasmania isolation must be preserved if island life is to be
protected from those mad other worlds. How, then, is isolation also deployed as a
resource by which to combat that notion of the spatialization of governmental
thought that emphasizes the perils of isomorphism, and shown in the New Tasmania?
Resisting Development in the New Tasmania Style
In February 2003 the then Premier Jim Bacon addressed delegates at the Second
Global Summit on Peace through Tourism in Geneva. He remarked on the fact that:
We are islands of tremendous resourcefulness and innovation, creatively
connected to a diverse and spectacular landscape . . . As a state of islands we
are especially connected to other islands of the globe. We have an affinity with all
who, like us, have experienced a painful past, and we are building a new
connection with those blessed with a creative culture that nurtures our future.
(Bacon, 2003, p. 1)
Bacon’s discursive construction of Tasmania as coherent, significant and interna-
tional performs much spatialized governmental work: the New Tasmania is a safe,
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open, progressive and cosmopolitan location. It is an appropriate partner for any
prospective other wishing to engage in the sophisticated transactions of globaliza-
tion, deeply appealing as a destination, and to be understood as a ‘spectacular’
domain for investment. Such views stand in stark contrast to long-standing mainland
caricatures of the state as an inward-looking mendicant or as permanently engaged
in the plunder of the place. The latter was emphasized by Tasmanian author Richard
Flanagan, who questioned the eulogizing of the premier after his death in mid-2004
by suggesting:
Tasmania remains the poorest state in the Commonwealth . . . its unique
environment is being destroyed . . . its celebrated coast and world heritage areas
are under attack from inappropriate tourist developments . . . its democracy has
been left debased . . . Bacon’s legacy was to hand Tasmania’s economy
and . . . direction over to . . . big businesses with too much influence, too much
power and too little concern for ordinary Tasmanians. (Flanagan, 2004, no page
number)
These observations exemplify a highly charged, alternative and resistant spatializa-
tion of governmental thought about Tasmania as a place for ordinary people. Such
debates go to the heart of what it means to try and comprehend the consequence of
various strategies and tactics of government that shape conduct and constitute
regimes of truth about that being in place (Dean, 1999). On the one hand, for those
who advocate the New Tasmania, the promise of development investment is
incontrovertible, and its benefits should be capitalized upon. On the other, for those
who question the values of the New Tasmania, the opposite holds: the risk of
recreating Tasmania as part of the globalised ‘everywhere the same’ is too great to
countenance.
Similar tensions are raised again in ‘State of flux’, a feature on Tasmania in the
January 2005 issue of the broadsheet Australian Financial Review Magazine. It refers
to a proposal by a mainland developer, Lang Walker Corporation, to construct a
$400 million suburb of 800 residences around canals, jetties and marinas in an
internationally significant migratory bird conservation zone and village community
known as Ralphs Bay (Neales, 2005). That sea-change development draws attention
to two wider problems. First, similar plans by that corporation on the mainland have
been criticized as unsustainable on social, economic and environmental grounds
(New South Wales Legislative Council Hansard, 2004), and protestors concerned
about the possible Tasmanian development suggested that the corporation came to
see the island as an easy target—its state and some local governments, and some
citizens eager for investment dollars to offset economic peripherality. Second,
Australia’s housing boom has inflated the Tasmanian property market and some
Tasmanians have been pushed out of the market altogether (Tasmanian Council of
Social Services (TasCOSS), 2005). As elaborated below, others are gravely concerned
about what may happen to island life if coastal land continues to be privatized and
alienated.
Located on the eastern shore of the Derwent River in the capital city of Hobart,
Ralphs Bay has been the subject of major protests about development in Tasmania
between 2003 and the present, after which Lang Walker Corporation temporarily
582 E. Stratford
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withdrew its proposal.7 During the period profoundly sovereigntist and highly
spatialized sentiments have been articulated by key protesters against the
corporation, sentiments that re-inscribe Tasmania’s island status and certain values
of social equity that have underpinned the national imaginary since federation:
the beach is our birthright as citizens of this island continent. At the ocean’s
edge we are all equal whatever our station in life, wherever we have come from.
The laconic, easy going aspects of our national character have been shaped in
part by the love of sand, sunshine and saltwater. We take it for granted that our
coastline belongs to no one and it belongs to every one of us . . . It is our true
common wealth. (O’Connor, 2004, no page number)
Neales then refers to Tasmania’s position in the 1990s, when it was ‘‘haemorrhaging
economically, socially and demographically’’ (2005, p. 28), and describes how, after
1998, it began aggressively to pursue international investment dollars, with the result
that ‘‘80 per cent of Tasmanians now feel confident about the future. A place where
there is a sense of excitement. Where we are no longer the butt of jokes, but are now
the leaders’’ (Lennon, in Neales, 2005, p. 28).
Such optimism does not preclude the possibility that the New Tasmania is much
like the old, described by Tasmanian and island scholar Peter Hay as follows:
‘‘if this government’s New Tasmania is . . . about record investments in forestry,
mineral extraction, urban coastal development and attracting new industry at any
cost, then actually it is an old Tasmania of the sixties and seventies, and not a
New Tasmania at all’’ (Hay, in Neales, 2005, p. 32a). During those decades
Tasmanian governments and the Hydro Electric Commission, among others, were
engaged in what has become known as hydro-industrialization—massive infra-
structure projects involving the construction of dams in pristine wilderness areas.
Walker (1999) suggests that such activities are symptomatic of ‘statist devel-
opmentalism’, the persistence, in policy, of which is aided by particular features in
Australian government, not least among them ‘‘the political relationship of granter
and grantee [which] has the effect of distorting project evaluation away from
economic and ecological rationality towards political [rationality]’’ (Walker, 1999,
p. 38). For Walker statist developmentalism in Tasmania has been especially
parasitic.
In this light it is ironic that Tasmania is seen as special for its remarkable natural
heritage, and for a population already characterized by an ‘‘unusually high pro-
portion of writers, artists and artisans’’ (Neales, 2005, p. 32b). She quotes one such
figure, the Tasmanian writer and publisher Lindsay Tuffin, who suggests that
Premier Bacon:
[misunderstood] why locals love their island state . . . [and thought that] an
unspoken ‘pact’ . . . has been smashed by government . . . [a pact that
explains] . . . why many highly skilled professionals—‘the creative class’—stayed
in Tasmania, with its lower wages and higher living costs . . . you put up with
Tasmania’s dark gothic underbelly and less pay and fewer jobs, because you had
access to these wonderful spots. [But the boom means that] . . . ordinary
Tasmanians have been locked out . . . by this other big business vision of
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Tasmania of the Bacon –Lennon government. (Tuffin, in Neales, 2005,
pp. 32a – b)
For Tuffin, like Flanagan before him, Tasmanians and their uniquely placed ways of
life are at stake. To open Tasmania for business in the manner planned, to elide the
isolation factor, is to risk all.
Neales’ article generated at least two further responses from the different
perspectives of the development divide. One appeared in a major national financial
broadsheet and was by the Chief Executive Officer of the Tourism Council of
Tasmania, Daniel Leesong. His is a defence of the New Tasmania and the value of
tourism developments to the state, and it questions the elitist nostalgia of those who
would hold Tasmanian back (Leesong, 2005). The other was a feature in Tasmania’s
Islandmagazine by ‘ex-pat’ Tasmanian writer, Natasha Cica. Hers, in contrast, was a
lamentation on ‘Turbo Tassie’, an island exposed to the over-drive of globalization
whose various factions had been struggling over such issues for generations (Cica,
2005, p. 10). As one of those who left the island because of the practices of ‘Old
Tasmania’, she observed that:
Tasmania’s political battles are not just internecine, they’re intimate, and
frequently incestuous . . . Reasons for this have included Tasmania’s unusually
small number of distinct family bloodlines and the island’s peculiar and extreme
geographical isolation from real centres of population, political and economic
power. This paradoxical and parochial tolerance is the upside of . . . a
sentimental tribalism born of living at the edge of the Western world, and
near the bottom of its heap . . . [T]hings seem to be changing, now, even as some
stay the same [and] Tasmania’s now part of the wider world as never before
[but] . . . I don’t like a lot of the look, smell and taste of New Tasmania because
it’s making Tasmania look, smell and taste more like everywhere else. (Cica,
2005, pp. 11 – 14, emphasis added)
Final Remarks
Earlier I observed that intergovernmental relations in federal states can sometimes
be typified by cooperative contest between and among national and sub-national
jurisdictions, as each and all strive for a commonwealth of increase. At the same time
internal relations between sub-national governments and their citizens can be
difficult, and this can be particularly pronounced where the dynamics of the global
marketplace affect local attachments to place. I also suggested that understanding
how such relations influence our being in place also requires comprehending the
outcomes of particular forms of conduct and regimes of truth, and the spatialization
of governmental thought—especially that which privileges isomorphism.
In examining such matters I asked: how are Tasmanians using the isolated
and island status of the jurisdiction as resources to negotiate the direction of
development—and of tourism and property development above all. What does the
creation of the New Tasmania mean in the context of globalization’s homogenizing
tendencies? What lessons might be afforded to the study of sub-national island
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jurisdictions from this case? Some final observations related to these questions are
now possible.
First, islands are important analytic categories in the study of governance and the
spatialization of governmental thought. Sub-national island jurisdictions are also
important and generally neglected categories in this task. There may be much to
learn about globalization and its effects on island life by studying the resources that
island peoples bring to bear in negotiating their real-and-imagined futures
among themselves, with ‘siblings’ and ‘parents’, and with others beyond the
sovereign state.
Second, in Australia the use of intergovernmental agreements on the distribution
of Commonwealth funds to sub-national jurisdictions is based in part on so-called
physical asymmetries and disabilities. Among these disabilities, the idea of isolation
provides significant dividends to Tasmania, just as smallness and peripherality do to
the ultra-peripheral regions of, for example, the European Union. In this calculus the
Bass Strait—a powerful icon of the state’s separation and island status—is a
significant mechanism for the flow of funds and tourists. Isolation is also used in
paradoxical fashion in marketing the state to national and international investors:
explicitly as a burden now overcome in terms of transport infrastructure and fiscal
equalization payments; and as metonymous for the best that islands have to offer.
Yet there are those in Tasmania—not least among them significant members of the
endogenous ‘creative class’—who suggest that to open the New Tasmania to
business and to share (and perhaps even sell) its isolated splendour is to expose to
great risk the Tasmanian way of life. Identifying this differential deployment of
‘islandness’ and isolation pinpoints significant contradictions in the rhetorics of
governance in Tasmania that provide lessons about the spatialization of govern-
mental thought and the ways in which globalization is understood, accommodated
and resisted.
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Notes
1. The commonwealth provides SPPs to influence ‘‘State expenditure priorities to satisfy national
objectives . . . [and to] achieve performance equalisation’’ (Searle, 2002, p. 15). Untied GRGs comprise
the ‘‘single largest avenue through which financial capacity is transferred’’ (Searle, 2002, p. 17). The
commonwealth also transfers around AU$1265 million each year to municipal governments via State
Grants Commissions.
2. Fiscal imbalance among states varies from around 75% (Tasmania) to 114% (New South Wales) of the
per capita Australian average. Variance arises from differentials in payroll tax, land revenue, stamp
duty on conveyances and mining revenue.
3. The CGC is a small, independent advisory body established in 1933; it has no constitutional status and
is an integral element of Australia’s federal structure. Members are appointed by the commonwealth,
after discussion with the states which have an informal right of veto over the three or four nominees.
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Its first task is to decide what range of state-type services and areas of revenue-raising should be
considered in the equalization assessments; and that is the subject of much jockeying (Searle, 2002,
pp. 18 – 20).
4. Western Australia is ‘islanded’ from the southeastern hub of population and economic activity by
desert, as is the Northern Territory. Other characteristics of statehood have variously affected other
sub-national jurisdictions (Brown, 2004; Kline, 2002; Mathews, no date).
5. The TFES gives assistance to those shipping eligible non-bulk goods by sea. Different criteria of
eligibility exist for ex-Tasmania and ex-mainland goods, and for people in special categories recognized
in federal fiscal equalization considerations apparent through isolation. Consideration is given to those
competing for prize money in sporting events, to professional entertainers, and to Tasmanian horse
breeders. I do not elaborate further on the TFES in this paper.
6. On 5 June 2006, following successive months of declining patronage, the Premier, Paul Lennon,
announced the sale of the Spirit III. The Chairman of the TT Line, Denis Roger, noted that the
purchase price of $111 million paid by European company Corsica Ferries was $6 million greater than
the original paid in Tasmania (Courier Mail, 2006; The Age, 2006).
7. On 2 September 2005, Walker Corporation announced that it would not proceed with the development
at Ralphs Bay, and it was widely suggested that the withdrawal was partly prompted by concerns about
its unpopularity and possible effects on the looming State election. Following Labor’s return to power
in March 2006, on 6 July, the development’s possibility re-emerged when the Premier tabled a bill to
give the proposal status as a project of State significance. The bill was being debated as the proofs of
this article were being completed.
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